The purpose of this supplementary risk analysis is to support existing import risk analyses on meat and meat products and provide evidence for the development of an updated import health standard for macropod meat and meat products (all edible parts of the animal) from Australia.
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Last updated
ISBN Online
978-1-99-106225-3
Biosecurity Risk Review on Chicken Meat for Human Consumption
This document is a qualitative risk review of the existing import risk analysis (IRA) on chicken and duck meat for human consumption, 2013. This reviews new scientific information that might impact the conclusions of the 2013 IRA. This document will supplement the IRA and inform the development of an import health standard for chicken meat.
After reviewing the hazard identification list of diseases and pathogens of concern, no new hazards were identified in relevant literature that warranted further assessment. The 2013 chicken meat IRA assessed six hazards to present a biosecurity risk to New Zealand. The present review did not find any new information that would alter the assessments in the original IRA.
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Last updated
ISBN Online
978-1-99-106220-8
Supplementary Import Risk Analysis: Freshwater prawn (Macrobrachium rosenbergii) broodstock from Thailand and Israel
The tropical freshwater prawn (Macrobrachium rosenbergii) has been farmed in Taupō, using geothermally heated river water, for over 30 years. MPI has been asked to approve alternative sources of broodstock of M. rosenbergii from Thailand and Israel, to improve the genetic diversity of the broodstock, and avoid inbreeding. This document provides a biosecurity risk analysis on broodstock of M. rosenbergii from Thailand and Israel.
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Last updated
ISBN Online
978-1-99-105296-4
Technical Advice: Risks associated with imports of whole or processed highly migratory finfish for human consumption
This document provides a scientific analysis of the risks of the introduction of pests and pathogens associated with Citrus fruit imported from selected countries.
Keywords: import risk assessment, risk assessment, citrus, fresh produce
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Last updated
ISBN Online
978-1-99-103958-3 (o)
Import Risk Analysis: Persea americana Plants for Planting
This import risk analysis provides an analysis of the biosecurity risks associated with Persea americana plants for planting. It provides evidence for the development of an import health standard.
The technical advice provides an analysis of the biosecurity risks associated with zoo meerkats and red pandas. It establishes which of the risks recently assessed by the 2021 zoo carnivora import risk analysis (IRA) (specific species from specific countries) also apply to meerkats and red pandas. It also determines if meerkats and red pandas harbour risks not assessed as risks in the 2021 zoo carnivora IRA. It concludes that the risks are the same as for the 2021 zoo carnivora IRA.
keywords:
Import risk analysis, risk assessment, supplementary, zoo animals, carnivora, meerkat, red panda
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Last updated
ISBN Online
978-1-99-103942-2
ISSN Online
2624-0203
Technical Advice Risk of lumpy skin disease via import of cattle and buffalo meat and meat products for human and animal consumption
The TA was carried out by the Ministry for Primary Industries to determine if LSDV is a risk in meat and meat products derived from cattle and buffaloes for human and animal consumption (except the importation of meat and bone meal for feeding to livestock).
The likelihood of entry of LSDV via meat and meat products derived from skeletal muscle devoid of lymph nodes (LNs) or other tissues (blood, offal, tendons and bone) is assessed to be negligible.
The likelihood of entry of LSDV via meat and meat products derived from skeletal muscle contaminated with parts of LNs and other tissues (blood, offal, tendons and bone), and via bone of infected cattle is assessed as very low.
The likelihood of entry of LSDV via meat and meat products derived from offal of infected cattle is assessed as medium.
Based on the available scientific literature on transmission of LSDV and the requirements of the New Zealand Biosecurity (Ruminant Protein) Regulations 1999, in the event of entry of contaminated skeletal muscle, offal or bone into New Zealand, the exposure of cattle and buffaloes to LSDV via these commodities that are intended for human and animal consumption is assessed as negligible.
Risk management measures are not justified for LSDV when cattle and buffalo meat and meat products intended for human and animal consumption are imported into New Zealand.
The document summarises the relevant biosecurity risks and risk management measures associated with zoo felids by utilising the information in a number of existing published documents.
Six diseases/pathogens are identified as risks associated with importing non-domestic Felidae. For these diseases/pathogens, risk management options are justifiable. We recommend using the risk management measures proposed in the import risk analysis on zoo Carnivora and the import risk analysis on cats, dogs and canine semen to mitigate these risks.
The document reviews previous risk assessments related to the biosecurity risks from importation of horse meat and meat products. It provides evidence for the development of an import health standard for horse meat (all edible parts of the animal) from all countries. Food safety risks are out of scope.
Two of the organisms assessed may represent sufficient risk to warrant biosecurity risk mitigation measures. The risk level has changed for five organisms compared to previous assessments.
Technical Advice: Likelihood of foot-and-mouth disease virus spread via milk tankers and milk tanker drivers in non-restricted places during an outbreak in New Zealand
The Technical Advice was carried out by the Ministry for Primary Industries to support foot and mouth disease (FMD) preparedness improvement including updating the milk collection policy. The likelihood assessment examined the potential spread of foot and mouth disease virus (FMDV) from one dairy farm to the next through the movement of a milk tanker and driver from one farm dairy to the next for milk collection. The assessment examined the pathways by which milk tanker, driver, clothes and footwear could be contaminated with slurry, milk and bioaerosols containing FMDV when entering and exiting an infected by undetected dairy farm, during milk collection activity, and travel to the next farm. The likelihoods of milk tanker and driver, clothing and footwear being contaminated with FMDV, acting as fomites and further spreading FMDV to animals during travel to, and to the new destination farm were assessed to be very low.
Published
Last updated
ISBN Online
978-1-99-102625-5
ISSN Online
2624-0203
Import risk analysis: Actinidia plants for planting (plants in vitro)
This is a qualitative biosecurity import risk analysis (IRA) for zoo Carnivora (Canidae, Eupleridae, Hyaenidae, Mustelidae, Procyonidae, Ursidae and Viverridae families) from countries that are approved within the current Cats and Dogs – Import Health Standard, including Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Viet Nam for Ursidae. The IRA was conducted by the Ministry for Primary Industries to facilitate a trade request by the Zoo and Aquarium Association of Australasia.
From a list of potential hazards (approximately 110) of biosecurity concern that could be associated with the commodities and introduced into New Zealand, 17 agents were identified as hazards requiring further assessment. A risk assessment was conducted for each hazard that were assessed to be risk and warranted risk mitigation measures. The recommended risk mitigation measures included but were not limited to, country freedom declarations, physical examinations, health attestations, diagnostic testing, vaccination, long-term premises freedom, pre-export isolation and treatment
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Last updated
ISBN Online
978-1-99-100956-2
Import risk analysis: leafless Citrus budwood for propagation
Mathematical modelling of wind trajectories and biological data was used to assess the likelihood of fall armyworm arriving in New Zealand from Australia via wind-assisted natural flight.
It is likely that fall armyworm will arrive via this route in the next five years. Arrival in May or in September–November is more likely than other times of year. Arrival is more likely in the South Island than the North Island; however, arrival in Northland is also possible, especially in late winter–spring.
This supplementary assessment of a single arrival pathway should be read in conjunction with the full Pest Risk Assessment for fall armyworm.