This document is an analysis of the risk posed by exotic strains of avian paramyxovirus type 1 (the causative agent of Newcastle disease) in imported hatching eggs of hens (Gallus gallus). Although non-pathogenic strains of avian paramyxovirus type 1 are present in New Zealand, there has never been an outbreak of Newcastle disease in this country.
This analysis concludes that there is a low risk that exotic strains of avian paramyxovirus type 1 could be introduced in hen's hatching eggs. The spread of introduced strains is considered possible by a variety of exposure pathways, although the risks of airborne spread have been greatly exaggerated over the past 30 years. The introduction of highly virulent strains of the virus would almost certainly result in serious mortality in commercial and hobby poultry flocks. Furthermore, exposure of wild birds could lead to the virus being introduced into endangered native bird populations, with potentially devastating effects. While the introduction of field strains of low virulence might not cause severe disease in New Zealand bird populations, some strains may have significant effects on avian health and production, and since low virulence field strains may not be as stable as was thought in the past, there is a possibility that such strains could mutate to become virulent after introduction into chicken flocks.
Recommendations for importations of hatching eggs were made and for the review of the current avian quarantine facility standard, which includes safeguards for airborne spread.

This import risk assessment has been produced to enable the safe importation of cultured juvenile (1 - 3 grams wet weight) kingfish (Seriola lalandi) from Spencer Gulf Aquaculture hatchery, Port Augusta, South Australia, for ongrowing at a proposed aquaculture facility in Nelson, New Zealand.
It is proposed that the kingfish would be subjected to health assessments, certification procedures and import/export procedures which follow guidelines set out in the Office International des Epizooties (OIE) International Aquatic Animal Health Code (OIE 2001). It is proposed that after health certification in Australia (following procedures specified by the OIE (2000) and the recommendations herein), the kingfish would be placed in a sealed container (MAF/AQIS approved seal) and air freighted into Wellington from Sydney or Melbourne airports. After clearing customs in Wellington the kingfish would be freighted directly by road to an approved transitional facility at NIWA Mahanga Bay for 4 weeks quarantine. Upon reaching the quarantine facility the seal to the transport container would be broken only by authorised Quarantine officers. Once cleared from quarantine the fish would then be shipped to the culture facility at Nelson for ongrowing in landbased tanks or seacages for human consumption.
This import risk assessment briefly reviews the information currently available on the stock structure of kingfish in Australia and New Zealand, but mainly examines the fish health risks associated with the importation of kingfish and proposes various safeguards and procedures to mitigate those risks.

This risk analysis reviews and evaluates the current knowledge of diseases of the ornamental fish. Over 500 parasites and disease agents have been associated with the ornamental fish species permitted to be imported into New Zealand. A total of 35 of these have been identified as hazards and subject to risk assessment. Recommendations made as a result of these assessments include:
1. Temperate and sub-tropical cyprinids should no longer be eligible for import.
2. Ornamental fish species not present before July 1998 should not be eligible for import unless approved.
3. A consistent post-arrival quarantine period for all species.
4. Training resources be developed to better identify fish species
5. Actively discouraging the release unwanted fish into the wild.
6. Retail outlets should be informed of potential public health issues.
7. Surveillance be conducted for aquabirnaviruses, iridoviruses, grouper nervous necrosis virus, viral haemorrhagic septicaemia, Edwardsiella ictaluri, Edwardsiella tarda, Lactococcus garvieae, Aphanomyces invadans, Enteromyxum leei, Glugea heraldi, Bothriocephalus acheilognathi, Capillaria philippinensis and Argulus foliaceus.
8. When cumulative mortalities of 20% or greater occur during quarantine, suitable samples must be sent for further investigation.
9. Post-arrival quarantine period may be reduced 6 weeks to 4 weeks, provided that consignments are accompanied by appropriate certification.
10. Where the post arrival quarantine period is reduced to 4 weeks, the mortality rate for taking of samples should be reduced to 10%.
11. Aquarium water from the quarantine period must be disinfected prior to disposal.

This risk analysis examines the biosecurity risks associated with the importation of live freshwater prawns (Macrobrachium rosenbergii) into New Zealand. From a preliminary list comprising 76 viral, bacterial, fungal, protozoan, metazoan and other disease agents, white spot disease, white tail disease, lactococcosis, rickettsial disease, Aphanomyces sp. infection, and the nematode Angiostrongylus cantonensis have been identified as hazards.
Risk assessments were conducted for each of these hazards, and the viruses causing white spot disease and white tail disease, the fungus Aphanomyces astaci, and the nematode Angiostrongylus cantonensis were assessed to be risks.
Risk management methods have been presented including controls to be applied to the water supply used for export stock, testing of samples taken from M. rosenbergii, and isolation in pre-export quarantine and post-entry quarantine.

amendments to the risk analysis procedures

This document provides a scientific analysis of the risks of the introduction of pests and pathogens associated with Citrus fruit imported from selected countries.

Keywords: import risk assessment, risk assessment, citrus, fresh produce