The risk analysis examines the biosecurity risks associated with the importation of frozen semen and in vivo derived frozen embryos of horses, donkeys and zebras (collectively referred to as equine germplasm) from Australia, Canada, the European Union and the United States of America.

The disease agents considered were those in the hazard list of the risk analysis for horses and horse semen carried out in 2000. Organisms that are already present in New Zealand were excluded from further consideration. A number of organisms were excluded on the grounds that they are not transmitted in germplasm, including protozoa with complex life cycles, arthropod parasites, helminth parasites, and disease agents that are transmitted exclusively by arthropod vectors or helminth intermediates.

Thirteen exotic organisms or strains of organisms were identified as hazards and these were submitted to further detailed analysis. As a result, the risks were considered to be non-negligible for the following organisms: equine infectious anaemia virus, equine herpesvirus-1, equine arteritis virus, Borna disease virus, exotic Leptospira serovars, Taylorella spp., and exotic Salmonella serovars. These organisms were therefore classified as risks in the commodities, and options for the efficient management of the risk have been suggested.

This risk analysis examines the risks involved with the importation of deer germplasm from any country. An extensive hazard list of organisms of potential concern that could be associated with deer germplasm has been collated and preliminary hazards are identified as those that meet specified criteria. Mycobacterium bovis is the only endemic organism retained as a preliminary hazard since it is the subject of an official control programme under the Biosecurity Act 1993. Organisms that do not cause diseases of deer and those that cannot be carried in germplasm are excluded. The latter group included all external and internal metazoan parasites and diseases which are transmitted only by arthropod vectors.

Organisms identified as hazards in the commodity are subjected to risk assessment to provide a risk estimate by considering the likelihood of entry (the disease agent being present in an animal at the time of importation), exposure (likelihood of spread and establishment if imported) and any adverse consequences likely to follow these events. For organisms that are classified as a risk, risk management options are presented including quarantine, serological testing, agent isolation or identification, treatment and restriction of germplasm donors to those originating from free herds, zones or countries.

The following are classified as risks in the commodity and risk management options have been suggested: Bovine viral diarrhoea virus 2, cervine adenovirus, cervid herpesvirus 1 and bovine herpesvirus 1, foot and mouth disease virus, lumpy skin disease virus, peste des petits ruminants virus, Rift Valley fever virus, vesicular stomatitis virus, Brucella spp., Chlamydophila abortus, exotic Leptospira serovars, Mycobacterium bovis, Mycoplasma bovis, Mycoplasma mycoides subsp. mycoides SC, Coxiella burnetii, exotic Salmonella serotypes and phage types, and chronic wasting disease.

This risk analysis covers the import of frozen bovine semen and in vivo derived bovine embryos from all countries.

An initial list of 86 disease agents was compiled. The list did not include arthropod and nematode parasites as these cannot be carried by semen or embryos. Further consideration of these resulted in a preliminary hazard list of 37 disease agents or groups of disease agents, which were subjected to risk analysis. In some cases risk analysis was done on a group of agents rather than a single agent e.g. Simbu group viruses, Salmonella spp., mollicutes of cattle etc.
28 of these preliminary hazards were identified to be hazards and were subjected to a risk assessment. 12 hazards were assessed to be associated with a negligible risk and, in these cases, no risk management measures are required.

A non-negligible risk was identified with the following: Borna disease virus, bovine viral diarrhoea virus type 2, Crimean Congo haemorrhagic fever virus, foot and mouth disease virus, exotic bovine herpes viruses, lumpy skin disease virus, Rift Valley fever virus, vesicular stomatitis virus, exotic Brucella spp., Mycobacterium bovis, Mycoplasma mycoides subsp. mycoides SC, other exotic Mycoplasma spp., exotic Salmonella spp., exotic Leptospira spp., Chlamydophila abortus, and Coxiella burnetii. Options for risk management measures in order to effectively manage the risk associated with each of these have been presented.

This analysis is an addendum to the November 1998 risk analysis.

New Zealand importers have indicated interest in importing commercial shipments of possum fibre. This assessment examines the risks to animal and human health posed by such imports, and suggests ways to manage those risks to an acceptable level.

This document is a non-quantitative analysis of the biosecurity risks posed by the importation of unprocessed fibre of sheep and goats into New Zealand. The current conditions applied for the importation of animal fibre into New Zealand result from a review carried out in 1991. Under the terms of the veterinary agreement between New Zealand and the European Union, New Zealand is obliged to re-assess the disease risks posed by trade in animal fibre. Rather than consider fibre from the EU in isolation, this generic risk analysis considers fibre of sheep and goats regardless of country of origin.

The risks to animal and human health, including the risks of zoonotic diseases to persons handling imported fibre, are analysed. The risk of introduction of weed seeds in imported fibre is not considered in this risk analysis.
The diseases considered in this risk analysis are predominantly the diseases of sheep and goats which are listed in OIE Lists A and B. Exotic mites and ticks were also considered.

However, of the 35 diseases considered in the hazard identification, 11 diseases are identified as being potentially able to be carried on fibre of sheep and goats for more than a week. Of greatest significance are the two zoonoses : anthrax and Q fever. These have long histories of causing serious disease in wool handlers. Safeguards are recommended for the following diseases: foot and mouth disease (FMD), sheep pox and goat pox, anthrax, Q fever, caprine and ovine, brucellosis (B. melitensis), contagious agalactia, contagious caprine pleuropneumonia, enzootic abortion of ewes, Salmonellosis (S. abortus ovis), sheep scab (Psoroptes ovis), and exotic ticks within the family Ixodidae.

An analysis of the biosecurity risks posed by the importation of unprocessed fibre of sheep and goats into New Zealand.

This document is an analysis of the biosecurity risks posed by imported hides and skins of ruminants, horses, pigs, lamoids and ratites for processing into leather. This trade is in the interests of New Zealand companies operating in a globally competitive, fashion-driven industry where access to raw material at appropriate cost is vital.

This risk analysis was initiated as part of New Zealand’s obligation under Annex V of the EU veterinary agreement. However, it considers hides and skins from all countries. In this risk analysis, the starting point for the hazard identification is the disease lists of the OIE. The epidemiology of each disease is considered, particularly the survival of the agent in the environment and the commodity, and the route of transmission. For each disease a conclusion is reached as to whether or not it is considered a potential hazard in the commodity. The release assessment then examines the likelihood of potential hazards surviving processing. The exposure assessment considers possible routes of exposure of agents to susceptible animal species in New Zealand, and the consequence assessment considers the possible effects of such exposure. The risk estimation comes to a conclusion for each potential hazard as to whether safeguards are warranted.

Specific options for managing those risks are discussed.
General risk management options that are appropriate for effectively managing the low or very low risk posed by a number of organisms are discussed.

The risks associated with the importation of chilled or frozen meat and meat products derived from turkeys (Meleagris gallopavo gallopava) have been examined.

From an initial list of 111 organisms/groups of organisms possibly associated with turkeys, a preliminary hazard list identified 40 organisms/groups of organisms that required further consideration. Of these, 15 were identified to be hazards in imported whole turkey carcases and 7 of these were identified to be hazards in imports limited to turkey meat. The greater number of hazards associated with entire turkey carcases reflects the likely inefficiencies associated with eviscerators and lung removal machinery used during automated processing of commercial turkeys.

Following a risk assessment for each of these hazards, options to manage the following risks in turkey meat have been presented: Newcastle disease virus, highly pathogenic avian influenza virus, and Salmonella arizonae. For imported entire carcases, risk management measures have also been presented for avian paramyxovirus-2 and -3, turkey coronavirus, and the aetiologic agent of turkey viral hepatitis.

The biosecurity risks associated with the importation of chilled or frozen meat and meat products derived from chickens (Gallus gallus) or ducks (Pekin ducks, Anas platyrhynchos domestica or Anas peking, muscovy ducks Cairina moschata, or a hybrid of these known as mulard or moulard ducks) have been examined.

From an initial list of 116 organisms/groups of organisms possibly associated with chickens and ducks, a preliminary hazard list identified 47 organisms/groups of organisms that required further consideration. Of these preliminary hazards, 14 were identified as hazards in imported whole chicken carcases, 6 in imports limited to chicken meat, 16 in imported whole duck carcases and 10 of these were identified as hazards in imports limited to duck meat.

Following a risk assessment for each of these hazards, options to manage the risk associated with the following hazards in chicken meat have been presented: Newcastle disease virus, highly pathogenic avian influenza virus, infectious bursal disease virus, and Salmonella arizonae. For imported whole chicken carcases, risk management measures have also been presented for avian paramyxovirus-2 and exotic strains of infectious bronchitis virus.

Options to manage the risk associated with the following hazards in duck meat have been presented: Newcastle disease virus, highly pathogenic avian influenza virus, duck hepatitis virus, derzsy’s disease virus (muscovy ducks and their hybrids only) and Salmonella arizonae. For imported whole duck carcases, risk management measures have also been presented for avian paramyxovirus-2 and duck virus enteritis virus.

This analysis examines the biosecurity risks posed by sausage casings of ovine or caprine origin, prepared by methods which are standard operating procedures in much of the international casings industry.

The sausage casings under consideration are processed from the intestines of animals which have passed ante- and post-mortem inspection. In making sausage casings from the intestines of sheep and goats, only the small intestines are used, and the only tissue which remains after processing is the submucosal layer. After cleaning and scraping, the casings are stored at room temperature in either dry salt or saturated brine for a minimum of 30 days, which is standard industry practice. Once pulled from the abdominal cavity, the sheep or goat intestines have the gut contents stripped from them before being placed in cool storage overnight during which time the mucosa will degrade for easier removal. The mucosa is crushed in various steps and the outer layers (tunica serosa and tunica muscularis) are scraped off. The casings are cleaned in batches in warm water and studies have demonstrated that no lymphoid tissue (Peyer’s patches) remains after cleaning.

The 15 diseases considered in this import risk analysis are those identified in a previously-published peer-reviewed assessment of the potential risks to animal health from sheep and goat meat products. This import risk analysis concludes that sausage casings processed, salted and stored according to practices standard in the international casings industry pose no animal health risk to New Zealand and could be imported safely without any disease-specific measures being required.

In September 2001 the sanitary measures were imposed on imported pig meat to manage the risk of introduction of porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome (PRRS) virus. This followed the publication of a report demonstrating that PRRS virus could be present in meat of infected animals, and that transmission of the virus was possible by feeding such meat to susceptible pigs. In late 2001 a draft release assessment for PRRS in imported pig meat was completed and subjected to international technical review. In mid-2002 a Canadian study was initiated to test the conclusions reached in the previous study. The results from the two studies were published in 2003 and 2004 respectively, enabling the completion of this risk analysis. The conclusions of this analysis are as follows.
1. There is a low likelihood that chilled or frozen pig meat from a country with endemic PRRS will harbour the virus when imported into New Zealand.
2. Since cooking inactivates PRRS virus, and since pigs are the only species susceptible to this organism, effective exposure would require the feeding of uncooked pig meat to pigs in New Zealand. Although scraps may be generated from imported pig meat at several points during its preparation for human consumption, the feeding of raw meat to pigs is illegal under the 2005 garbage feeding regulations. It is concluded that an exposure pathway would exist only on pig farms that were not complying with the garbage feeding regulations.
3. If pig farms in this country did become infected with PRRS through the illegal feeding of uncooked imported pig meat, the likelihood of spread to other pig farms would be low as long as standard biosecurity practices were observed.
4. If PRRS virus were introduced into New Zealand, the consequences would be significant on affected farms, particularly in breeding units.

It is considered that the risk of PRRS in imported pig meat is non-negligible, and sanitary measures are recommended to manage the identified risk.

keywords: pork

This review presents a technical assessment of the animal health risks posed by different types of meat product, from different sources, so as to allow as wide a range of products as possible access to the New Zealand market without jeopardising this country's enviable animal health status.

Imported meat has the potential to harbour exotic organisms that may be harmful to human and animal health. This qualitative biosecurity risk analysis examines the biosecurity risks associated with the importation of meat derived from ruminants and pigs, for human consumption, and also any meat commodity imported for any purpose (e.g. pet food).

An extensive list of organisms that could potentially be associated with meat has been collated and filtered through specific criteria to derive a list of preliminary hazards. These preliminary hazards were subjected to individual hazard identification whereby the epidemiology of the organism was discussed. Any organisms identified as a hazard were subjected to risk assessment to provide a risk estimate that assesses the likelihood of entry (the disease agent being present in meat at the time of importation), and exposure (likelihood of susceptible animals being exposed and subsequent spread and establishment), and any adverse consequences likely to follow these events.

In total, this risk analysis comprises 34 risk assessments. As a result of these individual risk assessments, 13 organisms or disease agents are classified as risks. Accordingly, for each of these, risk management options are presented.

The pathogens identified as posing a biosecurity risk when importing meat and meat products derived from ruminants and pigs are: African swine fever virus, aujeszky’s disease virus, Bacillus anthracis, Brucella spp., the agent of bovine spongiform encephalopathy, classical swine fever virus, Coenurus cerebralis, Echinococcus granulosus, foot and mouth disease virus, Nipah virus, Salmonella spp., swine vesicular disease virus, and Trichinella spp.

This import risk analysis is concerned with effectively managing the disease risks associated with the importation of camel meat for human consumption from Australia. In this context, risk is defined as the likelihood of a disease entering, establishing or spreading in New Zealand and its likely impact on animal or human health, the environment and the economy.

The meat would be derived from central Australian feral camels slaughtered and processed in domestic licensed abattoirs.

This document is a qualitative analysis of the biosecurity risks associated with the import of shelf-stable spray-dried powders, prepared from clean eggs, containing less than 100mg/kg of eggshell remains, egg membrane, and other particles, into New Zealand from all countries.

For imported whole egg, egg yolk, and egg albumen powders, heat-resistant variants of exotic group 1 avian adenoviruses associated with hydropericardium syndrome (Angara disease) (FAdV-4) are assessed to be a risk. Options presented for FAdV-4 risk management include: assurance that eggs used have been derived from flocks in countries or geographic regions where Angara disease has not been recognised, testing to ensure source flock freedom from FAdV-4, and further heat treatment of manufactured powders to destroy any FAdV-4 present.

Exotic avian influenza (AI) viruses are assessed to be a risk in imported egg albumen powders. AI viruses are not assessed to be a risk in whole egg and egg yolk powders. Options presented for AI virus risk management include: further heat treatment of manufactured egg albumen powders that have not already been subject to heat treatment proven to destroy AI viruses, testing source flocks to ensure freedom from AI viruses and certification that eggs used to manufacture egg albumen powders have originated from flocks in countries, zones, or compartments which are free of notifiable AI as described in Article 2.7.12.3 of the OIE Code.

This risk analysis examined the biosecurity risks associated with the importation into New Zealand of frozen skinless and boneless fillets (or mince derived from fillets) of tilapia (Oreochromis spp.) from Brazil and China.

An initial list of organisms of potential concern was developed from published literature, scientific texts, the OIE (World Organisation for Animal Health) list of notifiable fish diseases and official disease reporting statistics.

Thirteen hazards were identified from the list of organisms of potential concern and subjected to further risk assessment: iridoviruses, aquatic birnaviruses, Aeromonas salmonicida, Flavobacterium spp., Streptococcus iniae, Edwardsiella spp., intracellular bacteria, Yersinia ruckeri, Henneguya spp., digenean metacercaria, larval nematodes, Ichthyophonus hoferi and Aphanomyces invadans. Waterborne contaminants were identified as a fourteenth hazard.

None of the thirteen primary hazards were identified as requiring specific risk management measures. The separation of the fillets from the rest of the carcass effectively removes the majority of organisms that might be present in the live animal. Water quality standards were specified to prevent entry of foodborne hazards.