A risk analysis has been undertaken as a result of a USA request for New Zealand to consider market access for wild Pacific salmon from the USA.

The product considered with the risk analysis, referred to hereafter as the commodity, has been further defined as product which has been derived from fish of species within the genera Oncorhynchus, Salmo and Salvelinus; that were harvested from a population for which a documented health surveillance programme exists, which is administered by a competent government-authorised body and which has been assessed and approved by MPI; that were not slaughtered as an official disease control measure as a result of an outbreak of disease; that were processed in a premises under the control of a competent government authorised regulatory body recognised by MPI as having equivalent food safety
standards governing the processing of fish for export; that have been headed, gilled and eviscerated during the above processing; that have been individually inspected and graded during the above processing; and that were sexually immature, or sexually maturing, but not sexually mature.

This definition is consistent with regulatory processes to provide animal health and food safety assurances, and industry practice to provide health guarantees and quality assurances.

This document extends the risk analysis for catfish from Vietnam to include the same product from Malaysia.

This risk analysis examined the biosecurity risks associated with the importation into New Zealand of frozen, skinless and boneless fillet meat of pangasid catfish (Pangasius spp.) from Vietnam.

An initial list of organisms of potential concern was developed from published literature, scientific texts, the OIE (World Organisation for Animal Health) list of notifiable fish diseases and official disease reporting statistics. This list was critically examined using a number of criteria including the status of the organism in New Zealand and the exporting region, the presence of more virulent strains in the region of origin, restricted geographical range of organisms in New Zealand if applicable, different host associations in different areas and the official control status in New Zealand.

Eight hazards were identified from the list of organisms of potential concern and subjected to further risk assessment. These were iridoviruses, atypical A. salmonicida, Flavobacterium spp., Edwardsiella ictaluri, Kabatana arthuri, digenean metacercaria, larval nematodes, and Aphanomyces invadans. Waterborne contaminants were also considered as a ninth hazard. Following individual risk assessments, none of the eight hazards were assessed to be a risk in this commodity from Vietnam, thus eliminating any requirement for specific risk management measures. The process of filleting and the period of time frozen effectively reduce any pathogenic burden to levels where the likelihood of exposure and establishment in New Zealand is negligible. To mitigate any residual risk to human health, water quality standards were specified to prevent entry of foodborne hazards.

This risk analysis examines the risks involved with the importation of domestic cats (Felis catus), dogs (Canis familiaris), and canine semen from all countries.
This document examines each of the agents of concern by applying MPI’s standard risk analysis process. This begins with the hazard identification step, where the epidemiology of the disease including distribution, clinical signs, transmission, diagnosis and any available treatment is considered. As a result, each organism is identified as a hazard or not in the commodities.
Organisms identified as hazards are subjected to individual risk assessments, which assess the likelihood of entry, exposure and the likely resulting adverse consequences. For organisms that are assessed to be risks in the commodities, the risk management step considers options that could be used to effectively manage the risk.
The risk analysis concludes that the following agents pose non-negligible risks in imported cats, dogs and canine semen, and that sanitary measures can be justified for them: canine brucellosis, leptospirosis, plague, salmonellosis, babesiosis, Q fever, filariosis, leishmaniosis, Surra, canine transmissible venereal tumour, ectoparasitic infestations (fleas, leeches, lice, mites, ticks and fly larvae infestation), endoparasites (cestodes, nematodes, acanthocephalans and trematodes) and rabies.

This document is a qualitative analysis of the biosecurity risks posed by Babesia gibsoni in dogs (Canis familiaris) and their semen imported into New Zealand.
B. gibsoni is a tick-transmitted blood borne parasite of wild and domestic dogs. The tick Haemaphysalis longicornis, which is known to be capable of transmitting the disease, is found in New Zealand. The disease is characterised by lethargy, fever and haemolytic anaemia. Treatment is not effective in eliminating the parasite, and recovered dogs commonly become chronic carriers, thereby posing a source of infection for other dogs and ticks.
There is no evidence that semen poses a risk of introduction of B. gibsoni. Safeguards are recommended to manage the risk of introduction of B. gibsoni in imported dogs.

The objective of this risk analysis process is to identify and appropriately manage the disease risks posed by the importation of honey bee commodities. The intention is to ensure that a balance is achieved between New Zealand’s need to minimise the likelihood of disease incursions and their consequences, and the need to fulfil obligations under international trade agreements.
Risk analysis consists of a series of steps. The first is to identify those organisms that could potentially be introduced into New Zealand and whether they should be classified as a hazard for which a risk assessment is required. To achieve this, it is necessary to determine if the organisms have been reported in New Zealand (pest and disease status); if any strains in New Zealand are different from those in the exporting country and show variations in pathogenicity; if the organisms are subject to official control or eradication in New Zealand; if introduced, is the organism likely to spread or become established, result in losses associated with trade, production, control or eradication cost, or cause adverse effects on public health, animal welfare or wildlife populations.
Honey bees were introduced to New Zealand and are, therefore, not classed as wildlife and, as they are invertebrates, they are not usually included in animal welfare discussions. Of the pests and diseases discussed in this risk assessment, only causative agents of stonebrood are known to affect animals other than honey bees. Consequently, the remainder are not considered to be animal welfare or wildlife issues.

The initial risk analysis on honey bee hive products and used beekeeping equipment, written by a consultant on behalf of MAF Biosecurity Authority (July 2002), was re-written after public consultation, to bring it in line with current procedures and processes. The honey bee genetic material risk analysis of 2003 was used as the template for the re-write, and for consistency the same hazard list was adopted. The original commodity definition was modified by excluding used beekeeping equipment, on the grounds that there was too much uncertainty regarding the risks of disease transmission by that pathway, and to include honey, propolis, pollen, royal jelly, beeswax, and bee venom. In this risk analysis, these commodities were considered only in pure form.
Since honey bee pathogens are highly adapted to Apis species, the likelihood of any of the organisms on the hazard list causing unwanted harm to New Zealand native insects is considered to be negligible.
The risk analysis concluded that the risk was non-negligible, and that safeguards were justified, for the following organisms: Paenibacillus larvae subsp. larvae (the cause of American foulbrood), Melissococcus pluton (the cause of European foulbrood), Braula coeca (the bee louse), Aethina tumida (the small hive beetle), and parasitic mites of the family Varroidae.

In association with several external consultants, this document is an analysis of the risks associated with the importation of honey bee (Apis mellifera) genetic material - queens, queen cells, eggs and semen. The major reason for carrying out this analysis is to find acceptable conditions under which genes for varroa tolerance can be introduced into New Zealand.
Although MAF did develop an import health standard for bee semen in 1998, practical difficulties with its implementation have meant that it has not been used. This risk analysis has closely followed the development of a broader analysis of the risks of importing honey bee hive products. While many parts of these analyses are similar, the nature of the commodities considered presents different questions and challenges for each analysis.
The risk analysis on bee genetic material concluded that post-arrival quarantine would be required for a number of organisms of potential concern, and these are summarised in Chapter 43 of this document. Due to the uncertainty surrounding deformed wing virus and its association with varroa and colony collapse as well as the well-recognised risk posed by European foul brood, the only form of genetic material that can practically comply with recommended conditions is semen.

This analysis examines the risks posed by infectious or parasitic agents when importing pigeons from Australia.

Eighty three organisms/diseases of concern of pigeons are considered. Of these 17 are identified as hazards and are subject to a risk assessment. As a result of this, a non-negligible risk is identified with avian paramyxovirus 1 (low pathogenicity), avian influenza virus (low pathogenicity), birnavirus, exotic Salmonella spp., Coxiella burnetti (Q fever), protozoal blood parasites (haematozoa), internal parasites, and external parasites.
Options are presented for the effective management of risk, including isolation in quarantine for suitable periods, testing for disease agent or antibodies to the agents, and treatment for internal and external parasites.

This analysis examines the risks posed by infectious or parasitic agents when importing budgerigars from the United Kingdom.

Seventy nine organisms/diseases of concern of budgerigars are considered. Of these, 19 are identified as preliminary hazards and are subject to a risk assessment. As a result of this, a non-negligible risk is identified with avian paramyxovirus 1 (low pathogenicity), avian influenza (low pathogenicity), Pachecho’s disease virus (herpesvirus), psittacine pox virus, psittacine reovirus, exotic Salmonella spp., protozoal blood parasites (haematozoa), external parasites, and internal parasites.

Options are presented for effective management of risk, including isolation in quarantine for suitable periods, testing for disease agents or for antibodies to the agents, and treatment for internal and external parasites.

Live psittacine imports from Australia and England have previously been permitted into New Zealand. In 1997 these imports ceased although aviculturists and individual pet owners have continued to submit requests for psittacine imports and bird smuggling remains an ongoing concern. Illegal importations have no sanitary controls and therefore represent an unmanaged biosecurity risk to New Zealand.

Historically, large numbers of exotic birds have been imported into New Zealand with little consideration of biosecurity issues. These importations have resulted in the establishment of free-living populations, as well as many other species kept in captivity. This import risk analysis examines the biosecurity risks posed by infectious or parasitic agents when importing live psittacine birds from any country. Consideration of a list of 194 preliminary hazards has identified 24 organisms or diseases of concern which require further consideration. Of these, 16 have been identified as potential hazards and subject to a risk assessment. As a result of this, a non-negligible risk is identified with Newcastle disease virus and avian paramyxoviruses 2 and 5, highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses, psittacine herpesvirus, psittacinepox virus, avian reovirus, West Nile virus, avian bornavirus, Bordetella avium, Coxiella burnetii, Salmonella Gallinarum-Pullorum and S. arizonae, Plasmodium spp. and Leukocytozoon spp., helminths, and ectoparasites

Options are presented for effective management of risk including country or flock of origin freedom, isolation in quarantine for suitable periods, testing for disease agents or for antibodies to the agents, and treatment for internal and external parasites.

This document is an analysis of the risk of introducing turkey rhinotracheitis (TRT) virus into New Zealand from the United Kingdom in imported turkey hatching eggs obtained from parent stock vaccinated against that disease.

The need for this risk analysis arose due to the fact that vaccination for TRT, with both live and killed vaccines, is now common practice in all countries from which the New Zealand turkey industry can obtain the hatching eggs that form the basis of their breeding stock. The introduction of TRT virus into New Zealand would result in a severe short-term disruption to the turkey industry due to respiratory disease and deaths of young turkeys, as well as a drop in egg production in laying birds.

The risk analysis concludes that TRT virus does pose a hazard in turkey hatching eggs, but vaccines used to protect parent stock, be they attenuated or killed, do not pose a hazard. In view of the current pre-export requirements for fumigation and disinfection of hatching eggs prior to export it is considered that the likelihood of introduction of TRT virus into New Zealand in the commodity is very low. Further, in view of existing post-arrival quarantine requirements, likelihood risk of exposure is considered to be negligible. Specific safeguards are recommended for the investigation of outbreaks of clinical respiratory disease in post-arrival quarantine and the ruling out of TRT as the cause.

The potential risks to New Zealand’s native parrot populations has for many years motivated MAF to adopt a very cautious approach regarding the importation of birds in general and psittacine birds in particular. For at least the past decade there has been no way to import these birds legally, either as live birds or as hatching eggs. This situation has been recognised as one that has encouraged smuggling of these valuable species.

Recognising that the biosecurity risks associated with eggs are considerably lower than with live birds, an import risk analysis on hatching eggs of passerine birds was completed in 2006 MAF. Building on the experience gained during that project, this risk analysis considers the biosecurity risks associated with the importation of hatching eggs of birds in the order Psittaciformes. In carrying out this analysis, it is assumed that allowing imports through a legal and therefore controlled process may provide a greater level of protection overall to New Zealand’s endangered species than by maintaining the current ban.

From a preliminary list of organisms considered to be potentially associated with psittacine birds, those that were considered to require further consideration were identified and subjected to individual risk assessments. As a result of the individual risk assessments, it was concluded that avian influenza, avian paramyxoviruses, reovirus, proventricular dilatation disease virus, Salmonella Gallinarum-Pullorum, Salmonella Typhimurium DT104, and Salmonella Enteritidis DT4 are risks associated with imported psittacines. Options for managing the risk posed by each of these are discussed.

This risk analysis considers the biosecurity risks associated with the importation of hatching eggs of birds in the order Passeriformes from the European Union.
From a preliminary hazard list of organisms, those that were identified as hazards in the commodity were subjected to individual risk assessments. As a result of the individual risk assessments, it was concluded that the risk in the commodity was non-negligible for avian influenza viruses and avian paramyxoviruses types 1, 2 and 3. These organisms were classified as risks in the commodity, and sanitary measures were recommended including:
1. Layer flocks of origin will be tested for the presence of these organisms prior to collection of the hatching eggs, and eggs will be collected only from test-negative flocks.
2. The imported eggs will be hatched in a post-arrival quarantine facility in New Zealand.
3. Hatchlings from the imported eggs will be tested for the presence of these organisms.
4. A biosecurity clearance will be issued for the birds hatched from the imported eggs only if all laboratory tests for these organisms are negative.

This risk analysis considers the biosecurity risks associated with the importation of hatching eggs of chickens (Gallus gallus) from the European Union, Canada, the United States of America, and Australia.
From a preliminary hazard list of organisms, those that were identified as hazards in the commodity were subjected to individual risk assessments. As a result of the individual risk assessments, it was concluded that the risk in the commodity was non-negligible for avian influenza viruses, type 1 avian paramyxoviruses, Salmonella Gallinarum-Pullorum, Salmonella Typhimurium DT104, Salmonella Enteritidis and Ornithobacterium rhinotracheale.
Risk management options discussed in this document include:
1. Breeding establishments could be either free from avian influenza for at least 21 days prior to the collection of the eggs, or the parent flock could be tested for group A influenza viruses with negative results.
2. Breeding establishments could have routine surveillance for avian paramyxovirus-1, and be free from avian paramyxovirus-1 for at least 21 days prior to the collection of the eggs.
3. Breeding establishments could be free from fowl typhoid, pullorum disease, Salmonella Enteritidis and have no evidence of Salmonella Typhimurium DT104.
4. Flocks could be free from Ornithobacterium rhinotracheale on the basis of testing a sample of laying birds.
5. Eggs could be hatched and chickens be held in quarantine in an approved avian transitional facility until required tests for avian influenza viruses and avian paramyxovirus-1 are completed with negative results and a biosecurity clearance given.

This import risk analysis supplements MPI’s Import Risk Analysis: Hatching eggs from chickens (Gallus gallus) from the European Union, Canada, the United States of America, and Australia, dated 28 January 2009.
The diseases considered to be a risk in chicken hatching eggs are assumed to be a risk in duck hatching eggs and the risk mitigation steps previously outlined for chicken hatching eggs are considered appropriate for the importation of duck hatching eggs. This analysis outlines the additional biosecurity risks associated with the importation of duck hatching eggs from the European Union, Canada, the United States of America, and Australia.
As a result of further risk assessments of diseases found in ducks, it is concluded that duck virus enteritis virus (anatid herpesvirus 1), goose and muscovy duck parvoviruses (muscovy ducks and their hybrid breeds only), muscovy duck reovirus (muscovy ducks and their hybrid breeds only), and Chlamydia psittaci should be considered a risk in duck hatching eggs and options are presented for their effective management.