The commodity definition for this import risk analysis is confined to 19 species of nonhuman primates from zoos in Australia, Canada, the EU, the USA and Singapore. It specifies that primates to be imported must be clinically healthy and originate from premises under veterinary supervision and not from what the OIE's Terrestrial Animal Health Code calls "an uncontrolled environment". The specification that the premises of origin must be under veterinary supervision is important in that it minimises the risk associated with a number of diseases potentially carried by the primates. The commodity definition explicitly excludes primates which have been caught in the wild.

Fifty nine disease pathogens or groups of pathogens are considered to be of potential concern and could be introduced in imported primates. Pathogens not occurring in any of the countries to which this risk analysis applies and pathogens not associated with any of the 19 species covered by this risk analysis were eliminated from this list.

The reduced list of pathogens, termed the "preliminary hazard list", contains ten viruses, three bacteria, internal metazoan parasites (trematodes, cestodes, nematodes and acanthocephalans), external arthropod pests (fleas, lice, insect agents of myiasis, ticks and mites). Each of these is subjected to a full risk assessment. Options for the effective management of the risks are given for the following which are assessed to be a risk in the commodity; Hepatitis B virus, rabies virus, tuberculosis (Mycobacterium tuberculosis and M. bovis), enteric bacteria, helminth parasites, lice, ticks, mites, and weed seeds.

This risk analysis examines the risks associated with importing the marsupial Tasmanian devils into New Zealand Zoos. Imported Tasmanian devils will be confined to containment facilities. Therefore, the Tasmanian devils would not have contact with New Zealand domestic, wild or feral animals other than birds, and possibly vermin such as rats and mice that may have access to animal enclosures. The only direct contact with people would be with the staff that are involved with their care.

Few infectious diseases (viral, bacterial, protozoal or fungal) of Tasmanian devils were identified. Other than Salmonellae, the infectious diseases identified were assessed to not be hazards in the commodity. Several internal parasites were identified in Tasmanian devils. However, since these are predominantly species-specific and the likelihood that they could be transferred from animals in containment facilities is assessed to be negligible, they were not considered to be hazards in the commodity. External parasites were assessed to be potential hazards and options for effectively managing the risk of introduction of external parasites by Tasmanian devils are suggested.

This risk analysis considers the disease risks associated with the importation of specified members within the Order Squamata (Class Reptilia) from government-approved zoological collections in Australia and eggs of these species from the same source.

From a preliminary list, those organisms identified as hazards in live Squamata were subjected to individual risk assessments. As a result of these, it was concluded that the risk in live Squamata was non-negligible for the following organisms: pathogenic adenoviruses (Atadenoviruses), exotic Salmonella spp., gastro-intestinal nematodes, haemosporidian protozoa, Entamoeba invadens, and ectoparasites (ticks and mites). Options for sanitary measures to effectively manage risks associated with these hazards are presented. These include requirements that imported animals are held in pre-export quarantine for 90 days and measures based on treatment, diagnostic testing, or veterinary certification.

Individual risk assessments for the importation of eggs of Squamata were carried out for those hazards identified in live Squamata. It was concluded that risks in eggs of Squamata are limited to pathogenic adenoviruses of lizards (Atadenoviruses) and exotic Salmonella spp. Options for sanitary measures to effectively manage risks associated with these hazards are presented. These include requirements that eggs originate from premises where reptiles are under veterinary supervision and measures based on diagnostic testing and veterinary certification. Disinfection of eggs is not considered appropriate and the reasons for this are discussed.

This risk analysis considers the biosecurity risks associated with the importation of live animals and hatching eggs of species within the Order Crocodilia (Class Reptilia) from Australia. The commodity definitions used were: animals of species in the Order Crocodilia (Class Reptilia) which have been hatched and reared in captivity in Australia and which are clinically healthy and free from visible soil contamination; and eggs of Crocodilia laid in captivity in Australia. Eggs must be clean on visual inspection. From a preliminary hazard list, those organisms identified as hazards in the commodity were subjected to individual risk assessments.

As a result of the individual risk assessments, it was concluded that the risk in live Crocodilia was non-negligible for only one organism; Edwardsiella tarda. It is recommended that Crocodilia are required to have been reared in an environment with good quality water from a supply not inhabited by fish and have not been fed on fish or been exposed to live fish, or samples from both gular and paracloacal glands have been cultured for E. tarda with negative results and faecal samples collected on two separate occasions have been cultured for E. tarda with negative results.

There is no evidence that Edwardsiella tarda is transmitted through eggs or that similar organisms are transmitted through eggs either in reptiles or in birds. It is considered that clean eggs of Crocodilia imported from Australia into New Zealand do not present a biosecurity hazard. No risk mitigation measures are recommended.

The diseases carried by antelope have been reviewed. Forty-four diseases were identified that potentially carried by antelope. Six of these are diseases included in the OIE List A. The other diseases range from serious diseases to trivial or potential diseases. The likelihood of introducing any disease into New Zealand has been identified as extremely low, provided risk reduction procedures based on the following principles are implemented before and during the introduction: selection of antelope from safe sources, appropriate quarantine, application of suitable diagnostic tests, treatment or vaccination where appropriate, and use of artificial insemination and embryo transfer technology if possible and appropriate.

The highest potential risk to animal health of New Zealand livestock is the introduction of ticks that are vectors of 11 of the diseases carried by antelope and many other diseases of other species of animals. The possibility of disease introduction is probably higher for the chronic diseases, those that have very long incubation periods and those in which long-term carrier states exist. Of the 17 diseases that fall into these categories, only wildebeest-associated malignant catarrhal fever (Alcelaphine herpesvirus-1) is considered to be a moderate risk for introduction. Diseases requiring arthropod vectors such as ticks, mosquitoes and midges are most unlikely to be able to establish in New Zealand, although there is a low risk that endemic mosquitoes could carry some diseases.

Animals in zoos are generally well isolated from farm livestock. For this reason introduction of animals into a zoo situation is less dangerous than the introduction of animals onto farms. It is concluded that a well-managed introduction of antelope species into New Zealand zoos would involve minimal risk of introducing exotic diseases.

The risk of introduction of disease-causing organisms through the importation of live sheep and goats from Australia is considered in this risk analysis. Options are presented for sanitary measures to manage the risk associated with the following Bacillus anthracis, exotic Mycoplasma spp., exotic Salmonella spp., Leptospira spp., Coxiella burnetii, ticks, lice, internal parasites, Echinococcus granulosus, weed seeds, plants, and plant material.

Risk management options include quarantine, sourcing of animals from trustworthy sources, treatment, vaccination, diagnostic testing, implementation of legislative principles to prevent the establishment of an agent, and a prohibition on importation of live animals as appropriate for each case. A range of options of varying stringency has been suggested for each risk.

To prevent the re-introduction of Echinococcus granulosus it may be appropriate not to allow the importation of live animals and rely solely upon the importation of germplasm to ensure New Zealand’s access to improved ovine genetics. This measure would also effectively manage the risks associated with Bacillus anthracis, internal parasites, ticks, lice, and weed seeds, plants and plant material.

This document examines the biosecurity risks posed by the importation of live cattle, sheep, goats, horses and pigs, should any such animals be found seropositive during post-arrival quarantine after having already tested negative pre-export. On a number of occasions in the past serologically positive animals have been detected in quarantine. Each case has been dealt with on an ad hoc basis and, at times, the decisions made have been criticised by interested parties. This review aims to establish a basis for future incidents when seropositive animals are detected.

Under the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures, member countries of the World Trade Organisation are obliged to ensure that their sanitary measures are based on a scientific assessment of risk. MPI’s policy on serological positive animals constitutes an SPS measure, and as such it must be based on risk analysis.

The analysis concludes that for many of the diseases considered of importance for international animal trade there is an identifiable biosecurity risk associated with seropositive animals. However, for some diseases it is concluded that seropositive animals would not be carrying the infectious agent, and therefore could be safely released from post-arrival quarantine, albeit after a quarantine period of several months in some cases.

For some vector-borne protozoal and rickettsial diseases it is concluded that although the agent is likely to be carried by seropositive animals, the diseases would not be capable of establishment as the necessary insect vectors do not exist in New Zealand.

The analysis concludes that caution is warranted for several diseases which might be transmitted to some extent by the stable fly, Stomoxys calcitrans, for which the distribution, population density and ecology in New Zealand are not clearly understood.

A new disease causing fever, reduced milk production, diarrhoea, and abortion emerged in Germany in August 2011. A virus was demonstrated by a newly developed real-time RT-PCR and named Schmallenberg virus (SBV), according to the location where the disease was first described. Since then, disease caused by SBV has been reported throughout Europe.

Horizontal transmission of SBV requires the presence of a competent vector. The only known vectors are Culicoides spp. A Culicoides surveillance programme has been operating in New Zealand since 1991. Sentinel cattle are monitored for seroconversion to viruses transmitted by Culicoides spp. To date, no seroconversion has been detected in sentinel cattle and no Culicoides have been trapped. As there is no evidence of a competent vector in New Zealand, it can be concluded that if SBV were introduced into New Zealand with imported viraemic live animals, the disease would be unable to establish. Although recent evidence indicates SBV may be found in the semen of infected bulls, foetal malformations are only likely to occur if a foetus is infected at a vulnerable stage of pregnancy, estimated to be between day 28 and day 50 of pregnancy in sheep, in cattle between day 62 and day 110, and in goats around day 40. It is therefore very unlikely that foetal malformations would be seen in progeny derived from infected germplasm.

This assessment concludes that there is no justification for any additional risk management measures against SBV in the import health standards for live animals or their germplasm from any country.

This risk analysis examines the risks involved with the importation of llamas (Lama glama) and alpacas (Vicugna pacos) from Australia, USA, Canada, the European Union and South America.

An extensive hazard list of organisms of potential concern that could be associated with camelids has been collated. Preliminary hazards are identified as those that have meet specified criteria. Mycobacterium bovis is the only endemic organism retained as a preliminary hazard since it is the subject of an official control programme under the Biosecurity Act 1993.

Thirty three individual organisms or groups of organisms were identified as preliminary hazards from the organisms of potential concern listed. As a result of the individual risk assessments, 20 of these preliminary hazards were assessed to be risks in the commodity and for each of these risk management measures are presented: bovine viral diarrhoea virus type 2, bovine herpesvirus type 1, equine herpesvirus type 1, foot and mouth disease virus, rabies virus, vesicular stomatitis virus, Bacillus anthracis, Brucella spp., Chlamydophila abortus, Coxiella burnetii, Leptospira serovars, Mycobacterium bovis, Mycoplasma haemolamae, Salmonella spp., Trypanosoma spp., Echinococcus granulosus, other internal parasites (trematodes and nematodes), external parasites (mites, fleas, lice and ticks), screwworm and other myiasis infestations, and hitch-hiker weeds and seeds.

The risks associated with the importation of cattle from Australia, Canada, the European Union (27 countries), and the United States of America have been examined. Only risks associated with the importation of infectious organisms or parasites have been considered.

Of an initial list of 93 microorganisms or groups of organisms, 43 disease agents or groups of disease agents/diseases that are exotic to New Zealand or are the subject of a national eradication campaign in New Zealand, were included in a preliminary hazard list. Thirty four of these were identified to be hazards and were subjected to a risk assessment. A non-negligible risk was identified with the following: Borna disease virus, exotic bovine herpes viruses, bovine viral diarrhoea virus type 2, Crimean Congo haemorrhagic fever virus, bovine ephemeral fever virus, foot and mouth disease virus, rabies virus, tick borne encephalitis viruses, vesicular stomatitis virus, bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent, Bacillus anthracis, exotic Brucella spp., Mycobacterium bovis, exotic Mycoplasma spp., Pasteurella multocida types B and E, exotic Salmonella spp., exotic Leptospira spp., Anaplasma spp., Chlamydophila abortus, Coxiella burnetii, Babesia spp., Theileria annulata, exotic lice, mites and ticks, Hypoderma spp., exotic internal parasites, and exotic weed seeds.

Options for risk management measures in order to effectively manage the risk associated with each of these have been presented.

The intention of this risk analysis is to analyse the risks involved in the importation of those biological products that are not already under formal control by other mechanisms.

Non-viable products or biological products will predominantly be used by laboratories, which may be registered as transitional facilities. Amino acids, antimicrobials, and small molecular weight fermentation products were not identified as potential hazards. Culture media, proteins derived from fermentation, test kits that contain no live organisms, products derived from animal and plant tissues (including blood, microorganisms, and eggs) were submitted to more detailed examination as potential hazards but were then found to be of negligible risk.

Most biological products will be purchased from recognised suppliers of biological products and only a few of the products in these categories are of concern. Therefore a series of measures are described to control the importation of potentially hazardous biological products.

Microorganisms, cell cultures and other live cells from plants and animals have been analysed separately. It has been recommended that they should be imported subject to the issue of a “Permit to Import” issued by MPI. It has also been suggested that a decision tree should be used to formalise the process of deciding whether microorganisms and cell cultures should be given a “Permit to Import”.
Novel products that do not fall into any existing category, should be imported only on the basis of a restricted “Permit to import” after consultation about the appropriate restrictions with DoC, ERMA, and MPI.

Commodities imported into New Zealand under the existing import health standard for use as fish food have included: rendered poultry products, Artemia salina and Artemia franciscana, other zooplankton, and blood worms (Chironomid midge larvae).
This is a qualitative analysis of the risks associated with the import of these commodities from all countries for use in both commercial aquaculture and for domestic purposes (e.g. aquaria and fish ponds). Following a request from a manufacturer, the risks associated with the importation of rendered ruminant meals for use in fish food have also been considered. In addition, as fish oil may also be included in fish food, this commodity is also included here. The key findings of this risk analysis and options discussed for the effective management of identified risks include:
• For rendered products subject to the time/temperature conditions described in this risk analysis, no hazards have been identified.
• No hazards have been identified in rendered fishmeal and fish oil which are manufactured under initial cooking conditions of at least 80°C for a period of no less than 20 minutes.
• No hazards have been identified associated with dried viable Artemia salina and Artemia fransicana eggs.
• Zooplankton species may be associated with hazards although a clear definition of these is not possible due to a lack of data. Irradiation may be appropriate to effectively manage the risk.
• Similarly, irradaition may be appropriate to effectively manage the risks associated with Chironomid larvae.
• It may be appropriate to limit the importation of ruminant meals to countries recognised as being free of scrapie and having a negligible BSE risk.

This analysis considers the risk of introduction of scrapie through the importation of sheep and goat germplasm (semen or embryos). The risk analysis was considered necessary because there have been significant scientific advances since the last scrapie risk analyses were conducted in the early 1990s.

The results of embryo transfer experiments conducted since 2001 were examined, as well as the available literature on the likelihood of scrapie agent being present in semen.
The very significant advances made in understanding of the genetic control of scrapie were evaluated for their applicability in managing risks.

Developments in ante-mortem testing for the presence of scrapie infection were considered and evaluated for incorporation into import programmes. The developments in rapid post-mortem diagnostic tests were not considered in this analysis.

The analysis concludes that the likelihood of scrapie being introduced by embryo transfer is extremely low and the likelihood of introduction by semen is very low. However, because the risk of exposure is assessed as high and consequences of introduction are also high, the analysis concludes that measures to manage the risks are warranted.

Various risk management options, including the application of the international standards recommended in the OIE‟s Terrestrial Animal Health Code, are considered.

The possible risks posed by the agents of so-called „atypical‟ scrapie and bovine spongiform encephalopathy in sheep and goat germplasm are also assessed.

This risk analysis considers the risk of introduction of disease-causing organisms through the importation of sheep and goat genetic material (semen or embryos).

Eighty five disease agents were considered in the analysis. Forty five endemic agents and one exotic agent (Acholeplasma oculi) that was considered to be unlikely to be pathogenic and not an economically significant disease, were excluded from further consideration. Scrapie was not included in this risk analysis as it has been the subject of a previous risk analysis. Diseases caused by ectoparasites such as insects, ticks and mites, and endoparasites such as roundworms and tapeworms were not considered because these parasites cannot be transmitted by semen or by embryos.

All organisms classified as exotic were subjected to more detailed analysis. For each disease agent, a conclusion was reached as to whether the risk posed by the importation of semen or embryos was considered to be negligible or non-negligible.

For all diseases that were posed a non-negligible risk, recommendations for risk management were made. In 12 cases it was concluded that importation of germplasm would involve negligible risk. Many of these cases involved diseases that are transmitted exclusively by vectors that are not present in New Zealand. For the remaining cases risk management measures have been proposed. These measures generally involve quarantine procedures and or test procedures to ensure that the donors of germplasm are free from infection.

In March 2012, the Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI) released a draft import health standard (IHS) for the importation of pig semen into New Zealand from all countries. This was developed from the 2011 draft import risk analysis (IRA) for pig semen from Australia, the USA, Canada, the European Union, and Norway. The 2011 draft IRA identified six organisms of potential concern in porcine semen (blue eye disease virus, foot and mouth disease virus, Nipah virus, Teschovirus serotype 1, Venezuelan encephalitis virus, and vesicular exanthema virus) but did not assess the risk due to these since Australia, the USA, Canada, the European Union and Norway claim freedom from these diseases.

Following stakeholder consultation on the draft IHS for the importation of porcine semen into New Zealand, this final IRA has been amended to assess the risks associated with porcine semen imported from all countries.

Twelve disease agents have been assessed to be risks in the commodity. Options for risk management are presented for each of these: Aujeszky's disease virus, blue eye disease virus, classical swine fever virus, bovine viral diarrhoea virus, foot and mouth disease virus, Japanese encephalitis virus, porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus, porcine myocarditis virus, swine vesicular disease virus, Brucella suis, Leptospira spp., and Salmonella spp.